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Space and Cyberspace 
On the enclosure of consciousness 
Abstract 
In this chapter I argue that the global privatisation of elctromagnetic spectrum 
marks this period as historically unique. I also put forward conceptual categories for 
understanding the nature of an emergent cybereconomy. They correspond to classical 
conceptions of property, value and labour, but in no way treat these categories as 
singular, simple or unproblematic. From a perspective informed largely by Marx’s 
critique of classical political economy, I frame the creation of a global cyberspace as 
the enclosure, or “privatisation”, of conscious activity. I argue that a full and formally 
defined cyberspace, at least as it is currenty conceived of, must prefigure the eventual 
alienation of human social existence at its most fundamental and definitive level: 
consciousness.  
Space and Cyberspace  
On the enclosure of consciousness 
Consciousness is the total awareness of life which people have. It includes 
their understanding of themselves as individuals and of their relations with 
other individuals in a variety of forms of organization, as well as with their 
natural environment. Consciousness is a dynamic process. It grows and 
decays with the interaction of doing (or practice) and cognition over the life 
cycle of the individual in the family and other social formations. It draws on 
emotions, ideas, instincts, memory and all the other sensory apparatus.1  
 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourses of men, the 
language of real life … The same applies to mental production as expressed 
in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics etc. of a 
people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. … 
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and 
the existence of men is their actual life-process.2  
Introduction: Space, electrospace and cyberspace 
This chapter is organised around the meaning of space in political economy. 
Space is a new and difficult concept, and perhaps for that reason it has not been 
discussed very much by political economists. Even when the subject of space is 
broached, most of political economy has tended to emphasise the time aspect, such as 
labour, the circulation of money and commodities, rent, the depletion of land and 
machinery, the movement of information and so on.3 But the meaning of space is, for 
the most part, left untouched as a problem. In other words, space – as exemplified by 
land – is generally assumed to be an unproblematic concept; it is the activities that go 
on within and between particular spaces that most of political economy  focuses on. 
But the legal definition and ownership of land is the very basis of private property. 
Without it, capitalism could not exist. As an idea and a reality, private property has 
become quite taken for granted. But we can perhaps imagine the kind of technical, 
legal, and historical work required for the idea to have become a reality by means of a 
thought experiment.  
Imagine that you live at sea on a vessel that comfortably contains a about 40 
or so people. You cannot see land on any horizon. You have never seen it. The 
currents are such that the vessel drifts at regular intervals within indistinct but regular 
boundaries. The community harvests fish at one time of the year, whales at another,  
and nutritious seagrasses at another. Rain falls predictably enough so that people have 
enough water during most years. Here is the problem: in such a situation, how would 
you go about imagining and defining the space within which the community moves so 
that it could be broken up into separate subdivisions which could be owned by 
particular individuals?  
At the very least, you would need technical and legal definitions of the space. 
Your community would also need the means to patrol and enforce the boundaries of 
each and every subdivision, as well as the the boundaries of the community as a 
whole. Otherwise anybody could redefine the space in their own terms, perhaps 
dispossessing incumbents of their spaces. This is basically how the idea of privately 
owned land became a reality over roughly three hundred years.4 But the pre-existence 
of a set of more or less informal and flexible social relationships within that space is 
most essential to formalising it. In other words, we create the possibility for property 
only by doing what we do within certain places.  
Our ideas about the meaning of space are inseparably tied to our conceptions 
and experience of property, work, family, community and nationality. They are a 
function of the entire web of activities and relationships in which we are embedded.5 
We make many kinds of spaces by doing what we do: social space, organic space, 
symbolic space and geographical space, to name only a few.6 For example, a 
conversation in a workplace can be viewed as creating many different types of social 
and symbolic spaces all at once. The conversation creates and maintains interpersonal 
spaces, or relationships between people; attitudinal spaces, or cultures; organisational 
spaces, within which social behaviours are regulated; and ideational spaces, in which 
special ways of knowing are preserved, such as in an economics department of a 
University or a legal firm.7  
But these social and symbolic spaces are of a distinctly different nature than 
the much more concrete kinds of space I am discussing here (such as the land and 
buildings in which a workplace conversation might take place). Social and symbolic 
spaces are activity spaces and thus are time-bound. Geotechnical spaces – like land, 
sea and air – exist independently of what people do; they contain and constrain what 
people do (you cannot grow potatoes in the ocean); and they share a common aspect 
in that they can only be occupied exclusively: two different people, or groups, or 
factories, or cities or nations cannot occupy the same geotechnical space at the same 
time. It is simply an impossibility. The same holds for ‘electrospace’, or what is 
commonly called radio spectrum: a particular frequency cannot be used at the same 
time by different people or organisations.8 Like land, electrospace must be occupied 
monopolistically if it is to be used for any purpose whatsoever. Electrospace is the 
geotechnical aspect of cyberspace; it is the concrete, geotechnical area within which 
digitalised symbolic and social spaces are produced, reproduced, and exchanged by 
means of conscious human activity.  
The historical significance of the meaning of space 
There have been three significant periods in recent history during which the 
meaning of space has been redefined at the most fundamental levels throughout the 
West: the formalisation of feudalism at the end of the twelfth century; the enclosures 
movement between the mid-fifteenth to late-eigteenth centuries, which ended 
feudalism and created private property and the nation-state; and the definition of 
airspace and electromagnetic space, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, 
quickly giving rise to twentieth century nationalism. During these periods, 
relationships between the people and groups of people who carried on activities in 
these spaces were also legally redefined and formalised at the most fundamental 
levels. It should be noted that these three periods correspond to the widespread 
availability of new media, respectively: paper, the book, and the radio.9  
The current period is potentially as significant as these three preceding epochs 
in western human history because of an historically rare re-organisation of 
electrospace, once again facilitated by new media-related activities. But the 
significance of a privately owned global electrospace appears to have gone largely 
undiscussed in terms of its concrete spatial aspect, perhaps because it now seems to be 
pure social activity (whether commercial or otherwise). Since the discovery and 
technicalisation of electromagnetic spectrum, up until quite recently, ‘nations of the 
world have never departed from the basic “world property” concept’ of radio 
spectrum rights, and  ‘such rights have in practice been treated as one of the most 
important bases of politico-economic power’ throughout the twentieth century.10 In 
other words, the global privatisation of electrospace is – at least potentially – the 
global privatisation of that same power source. It is the privatisation of the space in 
which the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of ‘consciousness’ (or 
‘knowledge’) commodities have formed the basis of the most expansive, powerful and 
violent system of political organisation in human history for more than a century.11  
The centrality of electrospace to any cybereconomics  
Electrospace ‘is to communications today as land is to crops and water to fish. 
It is a peculiar natural resource, one whose politico-economic and social aspects have 
largely been ignored by social scientists’.12 The tendency of social science to ignore 
the spatial aspect of electrospace continues. However to understand the historical 
significance of its “privatisation”, it is imperative that the spatial nature of 
electrospace be understood. Electrospace is currently being “cleared” of its occupants 
and “enclosed”. The assumption underpinning this trajectory is that internet traffic 
will ‘migrate from personal computers to devices like cell phones and hand-held 
computers’, and that the spectrum must therefore be privatised.13 Whether or not 
internet traffic does “migrate” to cellphones and hand-held devices remains to be 
seen. But the imperatives from legislators and business that bandwidth must be 
cleared for such an occurrence are very insistent.  
The public nature of the area currently being sold off (or given away) is well-
evidenced by the nature of its incumbent occupants. For example, in the the US, the 
‘Defence Department, law enforcement authorities and public safety organisations’ 
are expected to ‘shift’ their entire communication systems to other, less ‘useful’ 
spaces.14 That ought to be enough in itself to raise questions about the social efficacy 
of the current round of global bandwidth privatisations. Electrospace is literal and 
concrete rather than virtual and symbolic space, just like land. It must be understood 
as such to understand its historical significance.  
The consciousness of electrospace as a concrete space was far more prevalent 
when radio first emerged as a dominant medium.15 What brought this aspect to the 
fore was a heightened sense of nationalism throughout the most technologically 
advanced countries, especially following the unprecedented slaughters of World War 
One. A concern with mass propaganda, most notably in the United States, brought 
with it the realisation that ‘radio communication is particularly susceptible to national 
control’ because, more than other medium, electrospace ‘requires some control if it is 
to serve any human purpose whatsoever’.16  
It was therefore quickly realised that electrospace is a geotechnical space 
because it can only be used effectively if occupied exclusively. Over the last century, 
it has become the ultimate in public resources, like air and water. Electrospace is the 
non-depletable, concrete resource upon which any cybereconomy, if it is to exist at 
all, must be built.17 The ultimately concrete nature of electrospace has slid, for the 
most part, into the realms of incomprehensibility for people. It has become, once 
again, as conceptually opaque as the idea of privately owned land, around which the 
relations of capitalism were first organised. Electromagnetic spectrum exists 
everywhere at all times and all frequencies. But because it is most generally sold in 
lengths of time (like, for example, a thirty-second radio or television advertisement), 
it is most readily understood as such.  
Alternatively, legislators treat electrospace like “raw material”, or as a kind of 
‘space in the fourth dimension’ which should, according to the tenets of 
neoliberalism, be left ‘open to private exploitation, vesting title to the waves 
according to priority of discovery and occupation’, but that is not the case:  
the wave length is not a fourth dimension, for there is also breadth and depth of wave 
(amplitude and frequency) and doubtless the correct analogy is the whole electro-
magnetic field; but private property in any natural field or wave is only a human 
convention and one that it would be dangerous to extend to this new-discovered 
continent.18  
A new-discovered continent, indeed; all-pervasive, and clearly all of a piece. But 
those words were written in 1924. Today electrospace is potentially a global rather 
than national space—it is our only potentially global, concrete activity space. 
Unfortunately, it has become passé if not entirely “invisible”, both as space and as a 
source of social power. It has been relegated to the realm of myth because it is 
generally sold and understood as quantities of time. But in political economic terms, 
the time aspect is invariably and inevitably tied to labour, to what people do. In any 
cyberspace, the activities that must be technically redefined, appropriated and 
commodified are the products of conscious human activity.  
Human activity and space: Time and the labours of consciousness  
If any concrete space is to become private property with economic 
significance, the pre-existence of an established network of social activities is an 
absolute prerequisite.19 Like the ownership of space, the formal ownership of human 
activity and its products is a matter of law: ‘How does one become an owner of 
productive stock? How does one become owner of the product created by means of 
this stock? Through positive law’.20 The legal distribution of property rights in the 
ownership of human activity and interaction is perhaps the most overt aspect of any 
transition in human social relations. John of Salisbury’s Policratus is historically 
instructive in this respect.21 It comes  
just before the important turning-point in institutional development at the end of the 
twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century, when legal precision began to be 
stamped on a number of previously indefinite relationships, and when feudal 
independence tended to become consolidated into definite organs of political 
control.22  
Similarly today, new forms of legal precision are being stamped on human social 
relations at the most intimate levels of existence.23 There is also a pervasive sense, as 
there was during the enclosures movement, that there exists an unbreachable social 
and conscious distance between the people who define rules for human behaviour, for 
value creation, and for almost all forms of human activity, and those who are bound 
by those rules but are excluded from making them.24  
Social space, social distance, and consciousness commodities 
Like the legal definition of geotechnical spaces, “official” definitions of social 
relationships are a function of legal expertise. The same holds for other social 
technologies, such as policies that define the legitimacy of wage- and money-forms, 
production technologies, management techniques, and the way in which legally 
sanctioned violence (war and punishment) is organised. As such, expert legal and 
political definitions also formalise and fix (to a certain extent and for a certain time) 
the meaning of particular aspects of social space. Legal definitions transform informal 
relationships into formal and legal ones, rendering flexible and variegated social 
relationships as relatively inflexible symbolic spaces, such as systems of law or 
management. It was from strenuous and sustained efforts in these directions that the 
historical development of wage labour became the dominant method of appropriating 
human energy – human life – or what political economy calls labour.  
This remains the case in the emergent “knowledge economy”, although pre-
capitalist labour relations are once again becoming dominant forms of appropriation 
(“casualisation” and “outsourcing”). The aspect of “labour” which is technologised 
and commodified in cyberspace is its conscious aspect. Consequently, today’s most 
frenetic legal activies are concerned with the ownership of the products of 
consciousness, or ‘intellectual property’.25 With the not-so-gradual development of a 
global, privately-owned electrospace, a practical, artificial, humanity-wide split is 
being effected (technologically and at law) between labours of the muscle and labours 
of the mind. The artefacts of consciousness that people produce in the constitution, 
reconstitution and transformation of their social spaces are quite necessarily the 
commodity-forms of any cybereconomy. I have elsewhere identified this as a 
definitve aspect of ‘hypercapitalism’.26 Although the activities and social relations 
that correspond to new commodity forms continue to differ in levels of legal and 
economic formality, the aspects of humanity which are to be formalised in the 
cybereconomy include every facet, function and product of consciousness.27 
“Information” produced for people, by people, about people (and their 
environments) is supposedly the basic commodity form of any cybereconomy. Art, 
science, culture, education, communication and commerce are said by legislators to be 
the main social domains within which cybercommodities are to be created.28 But to 
focus solely on the commodity forms produced within specific activity spaces is to 
miss most of the picture, namely their social, biological and environmental sources. 
With increasing attention given to intellectual property regimes, a new formality is 
being stamped upon existing social and biological relations of “globalised” humanity. 
More particularly, legal formality and money values are being placed on the 
conscious relationships that people have with particular symbolic artefacts.29  
Today, in the development of intellectual property rights, relations between 
such intimate and abstract “things” as words, sounds and genes are being formalised 
at law. These, in turn, are designed to be imposed world-wide.30 Flippantly defining 
commodities of consciousness as ‘goods of the mind’, or biotechnological products as 
commodities derived from the ‘essence of life’, does little to clarify the picture.31 
Such a view misses the point that these are already freely existing relations. But they 
are being technically redefined so as to be ownable and sellable as quickly as they fall 
within technological and legislative reach. As such, their redefinition is nothing less 
than the largest and most pernicious attempt at outright theft by a powerful group of 
elites in the history of humanity, if only because of the sheer size of the current 
human population. Individuals are currently buying the gene pools of whole countries, 
with the governments of Tonga, Estonia, and Iceland selling intellectual rights in their 
constituencies’ gene pools.32 
Underpinning the global expropriation of abstract human activity is a set of 
contradictions inherent in any cybereconomy, at least as it is currently conceived of 
by its technocratic designers. These are: the assumed predominace of the exchange-
values (money) over production-values; the collapse of distribution and consumption 
into the same moment as that of production and exchange; and the subsumption of 
use-value (useability) under the logic of exchange-value (sellability). Consequently 
the production of money becomes an increasingly irresistable imperative.33 But 
money is just the idea of value given a (sometimes) physical form. To fully unpack 
these collapsed relations would take far more time and space than I have here. But a 
brief excursion is necessary to comprehend the historical significance of these actual 
and conceptual implosions. Largely for convenience, I describe the significance of 
these trajectories under the term value-relations.  
Value-relations, spatial consciousness, and the alien realities of cyberspace 
The idea of value ‘is intimately associated with the most remote experiences 
of the human race. Ever since it has been possible to predicate desirability of 
anything, have values existed’.34 That is the definition of value in the broadest and 
most abstract terms possible: the social desirability of anything whatsoever. Value-
relations are those aspects of the social within and during which the desirability of 
any given aspect of our environment is produced, attributed and expressed by people. 
Value-relations are expressed as patterns of social ‘preference’ and ‘decision-taking’, 
or, what can be called evaluative ‘patterns’.35 Such patterns are largely the result of 
historical normative work. In other words, evaluative patterns – actively expressed 
perceptions of value – also specifiy the acceptability of what is perceived to be 
desirable within a given social domain.  
Because they are expressed choices, evaluative patterns peculiar to any given 
social group exist at the expense of other possible value-relations. In a globally 
mediated social system, ideally encompassing the whole of humanity, the very 
concept of value takes on very complex dimensions. Paradoxically, and perhaps 
because faced with such vast complexity, value has been narrowed at the policy level 
to the most singular and simplistic system, namely price. Discourses of efficiency, 
growth, progress and control derive their logics and techno-logics almost exclusively 
from this illusory, “thingly” system of value: 
The more production comes to rest on exchange value, hence on exchange, the more 
important do the physical conditions of exchange –  the means of communication 
and transport – become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its nature drives 
beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of 
exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space 
by time –  becomes an extraordinary necessity for it.36  
And this is precisely what has happened: exchange-value has become an end in itself, 
and the ‘annihilation of space by time’ is achieved by the conceptual implosion of 
concrete space (electrospace) and social space (human activity) into mediated time 
(conscious labour) through the manipulation of spatial consciousness. Value-relations 
have thus become expressions of space over time (how fast money circulates 
globally). Paradoxically, the larger this number – the closer it gets to a mathematically 
undefined term where circulation time equals zero – the greater the perceived 
efficiency! 37 In similarly vulgar terms, conscious social activity (social and symbolic 
space) is measured in terms of “the speed of thought” because, ‘expressed passively, 
the magnitude of labour appears as an amount of space; but expressed in motion, it is 
measurable only in time’.38 When understood entirely as time, social space is 
annihilated by imperatives for speed.39 There has never been so much human activity 
dedicated to the production of consciousness commodities. And time is money. It is 
also the most ancient and basic measure of human life: ‘In  Stoic physics there is no 
simple location, no analytical space’, nor did there exist a ‘common sense’ distinction 
between time and space during the archaic period –  ‘time was the only reality, and 
space still had to be discovered –or invented– by Parmenides after 500 B.C.’40 Space, 
in all its contemporary aspects, is a very new concept. 
The destruction of space by time takes place by means of increased rapidity in 
social exchanges.41 In terms of value-relations, this is expressed as a relationship 
between the fastest possible speed at which perceptions of value can be exchanged 
across the greatest possible space. Perceptions of value thus become the primary 
commodity forms of cybereconomic production processes. The production of 
mediated perceptions of value across vast geographical and electrospaces is 
simultaneously an ongoing and immediate complex of consumption (destruction), 
circulation (distribution) and exchange. A paradox of this globally imploded system is 
that by decreasing time distances between people, it simultaneously annihilates 
existing perceptions of social space. Therefore, in any fully developed cybereconomy,  
the alienation of conscious human activity from its source, along with the perceived 
value of that activity, is complete.  
Concluding remarks 
It is a commonplace bias of every age to think of itself as historically unique. 
At some level, this is necessarily true for every moment in history. But there are very 
few ages during which the relationships between great masses of people and their 
concrete spatial environments are redefined on such a far-reaching and fundamental 
level as they are today. The privatisation of global electrospace –  perhaps – 
distinguishes the current era from any other as historically unique. The enclosures 
movement was another such age, as was the formal definition of the feudal system in 
Europe during the late twelfth century. These periods combined the “legal” 
formalisation of previously informal networks of social relations with the “legal” 
redefinition of concrete space.  
While electrospace is generally treated by legistators as little more than a 
complex time-bound conduit – a medium – for symbolic activities and institutional 
organisation, it is not only that. It is quite literally a concrete space in the most precise 
economic definition of the word. Its most incomprehensible aspect is that it can only 
be traversed at a single speed—the speed of light. The speed of electrospace is its 
most confounding aspect. It conflates space and time precisely because of its speed. 
But electrospace nevertheless retains its concrete spatial characteristics. It is 
everywhere, all the time, at all frequencies. It is, as far as we know, the non-
depletable, omnipresent foundation upon which any future cybereconomy will be 
built.  
But there is more to grasping political economy than the technical definition 
and reallocation of property. We must grasp the domains of human activity that 
legislators are redefining, harnessing and exposing to commodification in the 
emergent space; the commodity forms of the economy and their relationship to their 
“producers” and “consumers”; the value-relations upon which exchange, circulation 
and distribution are premissed and enacted; and the global web of institutions that are 
ostensibly responsible for defining all of these aspects. Most importantly, we must 
consider which aspects of human social activity are to be commodified within this 
space, and whether such aspects ought to be legally commodified. And since 
electrospace is global – in fact it is our only global space – we must understand the 
relationship of those institutions who would claim proprietorship over what must 
become the property base for fiefdoms over the most abstract, intimate, abstract and 
concrete aspects of humanity. These are the foundational tasks for any future political 
economy in cyberspace.   
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